



Power and Prejudice: Analyzing the Decline of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan, 1955-1958

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Democracy, since the day of its notion, has become the only game in the town; it is the form of government where people choose their representatives to enjoy its true fruit. Subcontinent has a long history of kingship where most of the rulers came to rule it for certain period of times. Though, the emergence of British East India company in India was the change of masters not only for Hindus but rest of the communities except the Muslims. However, the arrival of British changed the infra-structure of the Sub-Continent. Initial drastic measures, by the colonial masters, installed the new political ideas in the minds of the Indians. Moreover, due to this political consciousness, the Indians were demanding self-rule in India that not only provided an opportunity in power sharing but also introduced democracy in the Sub-Continent on limited scales. At the time of creation of two independent states Pakistan adopted parliamentary democracy as a form of government. Meanwhile, the state's first experience with democracy did not remain pleasant one and it failed to achieve its true aspirations in late 1950s. This study has attempted to explore the fragile experience of democracy in Pakistan in early phase.

Keywords: Parliamentary Democracy, Governance, Leadership, Institutions, Power.

Introduction:

Pakistan has always been swayed between dreams and realities since the day of its emergence in August 1947. Those who were given the task of renovation of the state started to damage the political infrastructure of the state. It is natural when the process of erosion starts first of all, it damages its own home. Same is the case with Pakistan, its



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political team left no stone unturned to damage the system from the roots. As a newly emerging rising state on the map of the world, Pakistan was foreseeing a bright future ahead. Unfortunately, power hungry statesmen dragged the state into opposite side of the destination.¹

Pakistan had been facing all the challenges since the day of its independence. However, these were not quite enough. More had been added from the side of statecrafts. Constitutional struggle was yet in way to seek its proper map. After the passing of couple of years, this debate remained on floating water that what should be the type of system in the state either it should be parliamentary or presidential. The dilemma of constitution was the major hurdle in the way. Due to Punjabi and Bengali conflict not, a single individual could reach to conclusion.²

Dark chapters which were written by the politicians of that time, one of those was formation of west Pakistan as a one unit. This totally disrupted the whole structure of the country. There was huge personality contradiction between East and West zone. The dominancy of West was prevailed due to feudal outlook of the province. Complete hegemony of this brought up feelings of wrath among the messes. Although, they were living under same flag and carrying citizenship of Pakistan perhaps, interests of each wing were totally different, these shortcoming-built road for the separation among the messes.

One-Unit Scheme as a Dark Chapter in the History:

There were physically five significant ethnic communities residing in the area following the establishment of Pakistan. Bengal made up the majority of the people and was located roughly 16000 kilometers distant. The second-most populous province, NWFP, and Sindh's territories were all next to Punjab. N.W.F.P. was formerly a part of Punjab before being split off in 1901. Punjab played a significant role in British government whereas Sindh and Baluchistan were on the outside edges of British colonial control. In the colonial era, it controlled the armed forces and the bureaucracy. It did not want Bengal's majority to cause it to lose control of Pakistan. It sought to weaken

¹ Cited by the author, it is a personal exposure of the author while he was reading different books on Pakistan's political history. He observed that Pakistan faced political turmoil in its early years of creation. It always remained in the state of dreams, realities never revealed on the political landscape of Pakistan.

² This is cited by the author, it is crux of my personal thinking while reading I reached to that conclusion the whole of infrastructure was damaged by the statesmen.

the Bengali populace. This could only be accomplished by joining many smaller provinces into a single, larger province that would be ruled by Punjab. For this reason, Punjabi politicians created West Pakistan, a single province that included Sindh, Punjab, the NWFP, and Baluchistan, in opposition to Bengal, a large region that was given the name East Pakistan.

On October 14, 1955, this program known as One Unit went into effect. According to Aijaz Ahmed, certain Punjabi politicians and military generals were not pleased with how Pakistan's five provinces were built up when One Unit was formed. They wanted to join the four provinces in Pakistan's west to create a single province. With this plan, they believed they could defeat Bengal. They had previously been taken aback by the United Front's resounding victory in the provincial elections of 1954.³

They feared a future coalition in the parliament made up of Bengal's and West Pakistan's smaller provinces. Future provincial consolidation could isolate Punjab, making it impossible to protect its vested interests. The union of minor provinces into Punjab was required by Punjabi leadership in order to create West Pakistan. Politicians from Punjab, including Mumtaz Mohammad Daultana and the current governor-general Malik Ghulam Mohammad, supported this proposition. The one-unit strategy had the full endorsement of Iskandar Mirza and Ayub Khan. Another widely held belief was that Iskandar Mirza and Ayub Khan were responsible for coming up with the scheme.⁴

In his book, Hamida Khuhro said that Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani advised Mohammad Ayub Khuhro to consider the One Unit scheme one of the fundamental tenets of Pakistan's future constitution. One Unit Plan was a proposal that had the support of the generals. She added that the concept had been around for a while. Liaquat Ali Khan's premiership had pushed it higher, which made it necessary to overthrow the political establishment in Pakistan's smaller provinces.

The concept of one-unit formation can be traced back to the reign of Quaid-i-Azam. Sir Archbold Rowlands, M.A. Jinnah's economic advisor, first suggested the unification of the western wing in November 1947. Despite the Father of Pakistan's ap-

³ Abdul Chandio, "One Unit Scheme in the Federation of Pakistan: A Case Study of Sindh." Accessed July 7, 2023. <https://www.ijser.org/researchpaper/One-Unit-Scheme-in-the-Federation-of-Pakistan-A-Case-Study-of-Sindh.pdf>. PP. 300-308. Accessed online: 2 July, 2023.

⁴ Abdul Chandio, "One Unit Scheme in the Federation of Pakistan: A Case Study of Sindh." Accessed July 7, 2023. <https://www.ijser.org/researchpaper/One-Unit-Scheme-in-the-Federation-of-Pakistan-A-Case-Study-of-Sindh.pdf>. PP. 309. Accessed online: 2 July, 2023.

proval of the idea in principle, he deemed it premature and postponed the plan. Representatives of Punjabi interests argued that integrating the provinces into West Pakistan was in everyone's best interest.

The concept of the western wing's unification gave rise to a new defence for the eradication of "provincialism," reduced administrative costs, and fueled effective administration. Malik Feroze Khan Noon argued in the Constituent Assembly in March 1949 that the four western provinces should be combined into one to facilitate efficient administration ⁵

M.A. Jinnah accepted the idea, but he did not implement it because he believed that the time was right for that kind of plan at the time. However, Ayoub Khan claimed to have come up with the concept of One Unit on his own. He said, he used to work it out on the "warm night" of October 4 in London while fervently composing a document to address Pakistan's problems. In 1949, Malik Feroz voted in favour of One Unit in Pakistan's Constituent Assembly under the guise of "efficient administration". Begum Shahnawaz believed that the 34 West Pakistani districts should be combined because it would be advantageous administratively and economically. In similar way, Khan Muhammad Yousif Khan, general secretary of the Pakistan Muslim League, backed the single unit plan on the same grounds of ending provincialism and creating effective administration. Chaudhary Khaliq Zaman was hesitant to support the idea, though. The creation of the single federating unit made it abundantly evident that Punjab only considered battling Bengal's majority, and as a result, it came up with the concept of a single unit to protect its operationalized interest. There were various political and moral reasons why the creation of the program was incorrect. To oppose and downplay the majority of Bengal was morally wrong. Bengalis developed feelings of mistrust and dread over their diminished representation as a result. Punjab was maximising its power at the expense of infringing on Bengal's sovereignty and provincial autonomy. A unitary state was proposed in 1953 by Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana, the then-chief minister of Punjab. The federal system of government, in his opinion, is inappropriate for Pakistan. This very idea was what enabled the development of One Unit. In Friends

⁵ Athar Hussain, "One Unit (1955-1970) | A Threat to Federalism and the Reaction of Sindh " *Gofrixy*, November 15, 2021. <https://gofrixy.com/one-unit-history/>. PP. 177-185.

Not Masters, Field Marshal Ayub Khan mentioned that he was the one who first proposed the concept of One Unit.

“The One Unit was finally created in 1955 after years of planning. At the time, the decision was opposed strongly, and it is now viewed as a terrible period in Pakistani history. What purpose did the One Unit serve, and what significance does it have in the politics of the present day?”⁶

The Central Government of Pakistan desired a stronghold and unitary government by having only two provinces in the nation so that they could be easily administered and under control. The powerful individuals and the feudal classes in all of the provinces and smaller states were already targeted by the civil and military bureaucracy in order to gain their political support and cooperation. In exchange, they were offered numerous incentives, rewards, and better positions to jointly rule the nation as a form of compensation. The military also desired a quick turnaround.⁷

The bureaucracy's desire to send a message and put an end to the resistance movement in East Pakistan was the other main factor. Those in the corridors of power felt that they were disagreeing excessively and that the smaller provinces would always side with the dissidents. The establishment of One Unit was also intended to send a message to everyone else in an effort to intimidate them and maintain control over the situation, making it simpler for the West Pakistani leadership to establish their proxies in these fields. In creating the one province, certain East Pakistani figures, like Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy and Mohammad Ali Bogra, took the West Pakistani leaderships side. Since Governor General Malik Ghulam Muhammad had already dissolved the constituent assembly, proclaimed a state of emergency, and stated that the constitutional system was broken, he also started working on a plan for the One Unit programme. Dr. Sarah Ansari stated in her book *Life After Partition: Migration, Community, and Strife in Sindh, 1947–1962*.

“The administration framed this action as both administrative convenience and a political requirement to fulfil the romanticism of

⁶ *Dawn*, “The False Promise of One Unit”, July 3, 2022. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1697958>. Retrieved on: 5 July, 2023.

⁷ *Dawn*, “The False Promise of One Unit”, July 3, 2022. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1697958>. Retrieved on: 5 July, 2023.

unity for the country, as a counterbalance to the more populous and politically contentious East Bengal. The states of Bahawalpur, Khairpur, and Balochistan lost their independence, and Sindh, Punjab, and Frontier were combined to form West Pakistan. A similar concept had been circulating in official circles for some time, and many politicians had advocated various zone federations over the years. However, most other plans kept the core makeup of the existing provinces, unlike the one Unit's proposal to abolish them.”⁸

It was stated that the federal structure of the proposed new constitution would be significantly simplified by the unification of West Pakistan. Making a constitution would be simpler since the objective would be to develop a structure that would put East and West Pakistan on an equal basis. The issue of representation of the various entities in the proposed federal legislative had been a significant obstacle in the way of creating a constitution, as we had considered. Furthermore, it was argued that the unification of West Pakistan would end all regional rivalry and resentment with regard to West Pakistan. The consolidation of all of West Pakistan was a significant undertaking on its own.⁹ In his book *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*, Dr. Khalid Bin Sayeed writes:

“Civil military oligarchs in the centre, who until this point had only a partial understanding of the threats that the most extreme Bengali delegates, armed with a new mandate for maximum provincial autonomy, could offer to them, were shocked into making the same rapid calculations. They had already discussed the sub-zonal federalism of West Pakistan. By presenting the tantalizing promise of complete provincial autonomy for Bengal and the smaller provinces of West Pakistan, a more united Bengal delegation could take advantage of the political and ethnic differences in West Pakistan and garner enough support for a constitution that

⁸ *Dawn*, “The False Promise of One Unit”, July 3, 2022. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1697958>. Retrieved on: 5 July, 2023.

⁹ G.W Choudhury, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan* (Publications Centre: University of British Columbia, 1969), 85-90.

would undermine the central government. A weak central government would be the end result, endangering national unity, delaying economic growth, and undermining national security by weakening and separating the armed forces. The One Unit plan, which integrated West Pakistan, had to be developed by Pakistan's ruling class for this reason.”¹⁰

The democratic forces in the nation have never backed a merger that would lessen the federating units' distinct identities. The civil and military elite benefited from a move towards a unitary and presidential system of government. This prepared the way for Ayub Khan to rule the nation in the future. The plan was so unworkable that, in accordance with one of the reports Ayesha Jalal cited, the Quaid-e-Azam assigned Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy to work towards the establishment of an independent United Bengal state. That was not possible, the blueprint for such polity was lost with the Quaid because Suhrawardy either failed or died too soon. However, the fact that even such an absurd organization of two completely unrelated wings managed to coexist for 24 years should reveal something about the South Asian region's inertia and the robustness of the Pakistani state. Instead, the necessity to pay attention to the underprivileged and the need of efficacy remain the true lessons of the terrible terms on which East Pakistan left.¹¹

Although, Pakistan is a federal state, as historian Saman Zulfiqar points out in the Politics of New Provinces in Pakistan, the concept of federation has not been fully established due to aspirations for regional economic autonomy and growing disputes between the central government and the units. varied regions have varied justifications for wanting to secede, with Punjab, the dominating province, possibly offering the strongest argument.¹²

Pakistan was just created a year or two when the political climate rapidly deteriorated. In East Pakistan, there was a conflict between the civil administration and the politics. This conflict first broke out between Aziz Ahmed, the province's chief secre-

¹⁰ *Dawn*, 5 July 2023.

¹¹ *The Express Tribune*, “One Party, One Unit?” *The Express Tribune*, December 29, 2018. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1876954/one-party-one-unit>. Retrieved on: 5July,2023.

¹² *The Indian Express*, “Why Separatist Politics Has Plagued Pakistan since Its Inception,” January 18, 2023. <https://indianexpress.com/article/research/why-separatist-politics-has-plagued-pakistan-since-its-inception-8389691/>. Retrieved on: 5July,2023.

tary at the time, and Hamidul Haq Chowdhury, East Pakistan's minister of finance, commerce, and industry. Conflict developed over a number of different unilateral appointments made by Chief Secretary Aziz Ahmed to which Hamidul Haq Chowdhury and other ministers voiced strong objections. Unfortunately, there was no convergence of thought, says Bin Sayeed. All of the important positions in the East Bengal secretariat were held by Punjabis or Urdu-speaking civil workers from outside Bengal, including the chief secretary, who was a Punjabi. All of this was certain to arouse strong anger among the Bengalis in the area. In his book *Politics, Pictures, Personalities*, Dr. Naazir Mahmood notes that it has been normal practice to move around multiple ministries in different regions, which has led to an unstable climate. The governor general occasionally attributed various problems to the prime minister, governors, and chief ministers. He constantly kicked them out and put them back in for absurd reasons. From 1947 to 1956, the political climate of the nation was extremely unstable and continuously changing. provincial cabinets were fired or made to resign between 1947 and 1955, setting off the center-province conflict that destroyed hopes for a stable democracy.¹³

Not only in East Pakistan but also in West Pakistan, the battle between politicians and bureaucrats continued. The same individuals made up the next government, which was sworn in in 1954 following the dissolution of the first constituent parliament. When the new government took office following the dissolution of the constituent assembly, Major Gen. Iskander Mirza, the interior minister at the time, declared, "Some underdeveloping countries must learn democracy, and until they do so they must be governed. Politicians may botch things up with so many illiterate people in the population. Since 95% of the populace supported it, there was nothing undemocratic about the declaration of the state of emergency. Mirza said that the illiterate peasants elected scumbags and criminals who made empty promises. Everything messed up by scalawags, and I have to clean it all up. Education, tradition, breathing, and pride in your capacity to do anything well are all necessary for democracy. The comment from Mirza above exemplifies the mindset and approach of the Pakistani civil-military bureaucracy, which was in charge of the nation from its establishment until 1970 and had received British training. Gen. Ayub Khan, Gen. Yahya Khan, Gen. Zia-ul- Haq, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and some of the protégé politicians have continued to see ordinary

¹³ *Dawn*, 5 July 2023.

people as the work of some lesser God, following the lead of Gen. Mirza. The 1935 Act was periodically changed and abolished during this time, the 1956 Constitution was annulled, and martial law was enacted multiple times. In the years between 1971 and 1976, democracy was introduced to Pakistan for a brief while, however it was quickly reverted from the civilians in favour of dictators.¹⁴

The then-army chief of Pakistan, Ayub Khan, wrote in *A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan*, which is cited in Col. Mohammad Ahmed's book, *My Chief*, that he was staying at a hotel in London in 1954 when the idea of One Unit struck him, prompting him to create the plan for the fusion of Western Pakistan. He met the scheme's ardent supporters, Governor General Malik Ghulam Muhammad, Mirza, and Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, after his return from London. The West Pakistani leadership, which included Daultana, Mushtaq Gurmani, and Feroz Khan Noon, decided to take action after reviewing the facts. Daultana was tasked with creating the paperwork, initially for close friends and then for all political leadership.

Enforcement of Much Awaited Constitution of 1956:

Constitutional history of Pakistan is with full of complexities. It took a long trip to make its permanent constitution, on other hands, India departed her ways at same time and got freedom with us but, it had framed its constitution within two years. Right after independence, Pakistan faced a series of problems in her way. Most of the essential apparatus which was necessary to run the state of affairs was not present at that time. Lack of skilled leadership worsen the situation. Fortune drastic measures were not supporting the Pakistan. Politics of individual played a vital role in the delaying of constitution. Constitution is considered basic road map for the country, without any demarcated boundary country cannot grow properly. The Constituent Assembly received recommendations of up to 670 revisions when the draft of the 245-article document was brought up for comprehensive review. The majority of these amendments were put up by the Awami League members, the opposition party. A number of amendments were also presented by the members of the coalition government. Out of the 245 articles in the draft, 179 were swiftly approved; the remaining 66 were viewed as being extremely

¹⁴ *The Indian Express*, "Why Separatist Politics Has Plagued Pakistan since Its Inception," January 18, 2023. <https://indianexpress.com/article/research/why-separatist-politics-has-plagued-pakistan-since-its-inception-8389691/>. Retrieved on: 5July,2023.

¹⁴ *Dawn*, 5 July 2023.

contentious, some of which caused severe disagreements within the coalition government. The President's authority, particularly his right to dissolve the legislature at his discretion, his emergency powers, and his ability to accede to laws were some of the significant articles which still had a gap that could to be addressed for improvement.¹⁵ With the exception of the electorate principle, which was left to the National Assembly's determination after consultation with the Provincial Assemblies, the coalition parties reached a compromise on all of these contentious topics. Thus, the second Constituent Assembly's goal of establishing the nation's constitution had finally been accomplished. Its success proved that internal power dynamics in Pakistan were the true and biggest barrier to constitution-making, and that they were the main reason the first Constituent Assembly failed. Politicians changed their methods and started trying to find solutions to all the challenging problems when they realized that any further delays would not be accepted. The parity of representation between East and West Pakistan, for example, was suggested in 1952 and again in 1953, but all attempts to reach a compromise were unsuccessful due to internal power politics. In fact, the solutions agreed to in some of these contentious issues were not all that different from those which had been offered as early as 1952. The draft of Constitution was first presented to the nation on January 8 of that year. After some adjustments and amendments, it was ultimately approved on February. Pakistan was proclaimed an Islamic Republic with its own Constitution. The last vestiges of Government of India act 1935 finally rested in peace.¹⁶

End of Chaudhary Muhammad Ali's Ministry:

The President's interest in politics and the parties' weakness both played a role in limiting the Prime Minister's power. The inevitable formation of coalitions severely weakened his standing with regard to the Cabinet. Because he had to include members of the Cabinet picked by the merging party or parties, and occasionally even members of his own party, he was unable to choose his own team of ministers. His was not the sole voice in the Cabinet's deliberations; rather, it was just one among several. He presided over the meetings with caution rather than assurance.¹⁷

¹⁵ Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2019), 115-117.

¹⁶ Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2019), 120.

¹⁷ Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988) , 85.

In order to keep the Sarkar Ministry in place, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali had to compromise when drafting the Constitution. He also allowed the United Front to rule East Pakistan for a full year without being challenged by the Assembly and appointed Fazlul Haq as governor. Finally, he went against the wishes of his own party by lending his moral support to Dr. Khan Sahib's government in West Pakistan. He had little confidence in the Muslim League Party leadership he had acquired through a fortunate confluence of events.¹⁸

At the time, the Constitution of 1956 was put into effect, this was the political climate. The Prime Minister, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, became weary from the negotiations and bargains required to persuade the various interest groups to accept One Unit in West Pakistan and the passage of the Constitution. His failure to manage his own party and his bad performance as a politician contributed to his downfall. His choice of Dr. Khan Sahib as Chief Minister of the reunified province of West Pakistan, over opposition from a Muslim League group, was his biggest error.' Congressman Dr. Khan Sahib opposed the establishment of Pakistan. Thus, the Muslim League opposed his appointment, but President Mirza backed him.¹⁹

As a member of the Muslim League, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali encountered some challenges. He was the head of a coalition, with the Republican Party at its core, but his own party's legislative committee in West Pakistan was calling for Dr. Khan Sahib to be removed from his position as chief minister. The Muslim League was so undisciplined that they lost the game. Dr. Khan Sahib would have been compelled to quit, and most likely the Republican Party would not have existed, if the group had been united and none of its members had defected to join the Republican Party. Additionally, the Muslim League was being opposed by the entire federal government at the time due to Chaudhri Mohammad Ali because he was weak and real power was residing in the hands of Dr. Khan Saheb. In this circumstance, the central government could not remain untouched. The Muslim League, a significant member of the coalition but not in charge in any of the provinces, shared power in the center. In June 1956, the Republican Party was still expanding. With 22 members, it asserted to be the National Assembly's single-largest party.

¹⁸ Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988) , 85.

¹⁹ Khan, *Constitutional and Political History*, 235-240.

But Khan Sahib persisted in offering the Prime Minister his unwavering support, and the Prime Minister did likewise with regard to his support for the West Pakistan ministry. When pressured by the Muslim League to take action against the West Pakistan ministry, he asserted that as prime minister, he was only answerable to the Cabinet and the parliament and that the country's interests, not the wishes of any political party, should guide his decisions. This was seen by the Muslim League as a betrayal of the group, and he was charged with doing little to stop the Muslim League's division in the National Assembly. On August 27, 1956, he summoned a meeting of the Coalition Parliamentary Party, but Muslim Leaguers insisted that members. Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, outraged by this snip-snap, resigned on September 8 and left the Muslim League as well. The resignation of Chaudhri Mohammad Ali happened at a time when he had the support of the National Assembly and a sizable majority there. He refused to take a side with either the Muslim League or the coalition party because he saw himself as the leader of the coalition party as a whole rather than just the Muslim League. In Pakistani political history, his choice to resign on his own volition ²⁰while still holding a majority in the Assembly is unmatched.

Democracy in Troubled Waters and an End of Era:

A decade is not enough time in a country's history to evaluate the effectiveness of a certain style of government. However, for a new state like Pakistan, the first ten years were an important time for the democratic experiment for a number of reasons. The democratic values and procedures were not foreign to the politicians. Many of them had theoretical background in how parliamentary institutions operated in other countries, and many others had first-hand knowledge of how they operated in their own countries. Before India gained independence, there had been parliamentary government on the subcontinent for at least a decade, albeit in a limited sense. The provincial-level Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1921 and the local-level Morley-Minto Reforms, which were implemented a decade earlier, both included the roots of this movement.

The Government of India Act of 1935, which granted the provinces of undivided India exclusive authority in a narrowly defined sphere largely free from the control of the Central Government and the Legislature, served as the pinnacle of the process of democratization in the provincial field. Even though it represented just 14% of the adult population, the electorate was sizable enough for political parties to organize them-

²⁰ Khan, *Constitutional and Political History*, 135-140.

selves before aspiring to power. The Muslim League had made the decision to pursue Provincial Autonomy for all it was worth, and the Congress had made a decision along the same lines in response to an unequivocal refusal. Both parties, who had first rejected the federal section of the constitution on the grounds that it constituted a rejection of responsible government, participated in elections and assumed control of governments wherever, they could manage majorities. Only when the Constituent Assemblies received control in August 1947 was the Centre able to become democratic.²¹

Even though politicians were important to the Pakistan Movement, in the beginning the civil bureaucracy was in charge of running the government and had some influence over politics. Many of the state officials in the provinces were new. They had zero experience in political field. The old civil servants served as governors of three provinces. When compared to ministers, provincial governors and bureaucrats had more power. In the Centre, Jinnah, the Governor General and president of the Constituent Assembly, was in charge of all crucial issues. The political leadership relied heavily on the bureaucracy to carry out its obligations and lacked administrative experience, especially in the early wake of partition. Weaknesses in political leadership made it possible for bureaucracy to play a political role. During the imposition of martial law (in October 1958), bureaucracy facilitated the army to control over the nation. In India, bureaucracy was a well-trained and structured entity made up of police, government employees, and accountants. As the popularity and power of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) declined, the bureaucracy emerged as a crucial institution. Later, it received support from the military bureaucracy. Former bureaucrat Ghulam Muhammad was installed in office with General Ayub Khan's approval.²²

The Indian Muslims had no idea of nationalism or allegiance to a nation. The idea that love of one's country went against Islamic beliefs had been propagated even by right-wing leaders. Others, on the other hand, supported Pakistan as their home nation and after the division, prepared their political plans in light of the new challenges.

²¹ Ahmad. *Government and Politics*, 135-140.

²² Qurat-ul-Ain Bashir, "Preliminary Challenges for Democracy in Pakistan." *JPRS* 57, no. 4 (2020). PP. 38-40.

Pakistan had not yet attained the status of a nation, despite the crucial and democratic role that politicians may play in uniting the people to pursue common goals.²³

Despite its government being run by the Congress not having previously endorsed it, NWFP acceded to joining Pakistan in 1947 through a vote. The NWFP Assembly was dissolved on August 22, 1947, exactly one week after India and Pakistan were divided. Dr. Khan Sahib's Ministry changed by Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan's, who held the position of Chief Minister until 1953. Despite the fact that Khudai Khidmatgars held a majority in the NWFP Assembly and Qaiyum Khan belonged to the All India Muslim League (AIML), which garnered a meagre number of seats in the 1946 Provincial Election, the expulsion took place. Politics did not advance well as a result of this.

The ruling class in Pakistan started to develop the military to improve their standing in society. The civil service and the Army were extremely important to Ghulam Mohammad (Governor-General 1951–1955) and Major-General Iskander Mirza (Governor-General 1955–56, President 1956–58). Ghulam Mohammad could not have disbanded the first Constituent Assembly if the Army had not back him up. Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan's presence in the government following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly made it abundantly evident that the Governor-General and the Civil Service, who were supported by the Army, now held the true political sway.²⁴

The fundamental components of the Pakistani political system are patronage and kinship; if water is H₂O chemically, then²⁵

Pakistani politics are (Patronage and Kinship). Political factions are quite significant, but their primary purpose is to obtain favours, and their most significant base is familial ties. The relatives of these leaders do not typically make up the majority of the factions that support specific politicians or political coalitions, but for the politicians in question to have any real impact, strong kinship networks are nearly always a must. In

²³ Qurat-ul-Ain Bashir, "Preliminary Challenges for Democracy in Pakistan." *JPRS* 57, no. 4 (2020). PP. 38-40.

²⁴ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1985* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987), 83.

²⁵ Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 200.

contrast, ideology could be compared to the force that moves waves through water, or more commonly, just plain annoyance with the government in place.²⁶

Imposition of Martial Law:

The most notable instance of how an apolitical military may gradually enter politics due to the political leaders' incompetence to manage liberal democratic institutions was the coup d'etat in Pakistan in 1958. The military, which had a history of maintaining its distance from politics, playing no role in the country's independence, remaining loyal to civil authority afterward, and aiding all governments in upholding law and order, gradually began to play a larger role in the decision-making process and eventually replaced the civil government. The primary goals of the previous governments were unaffected by the coup d'état. Modernization, industrialisation, and democracy remained the new regime's goals, but how they were attained had altered. The Army High Command didn't begin considering replacing the civil government in order to curb political corruption until 1957. Two events suggested that General Ayub Khan had come to terms with the possibility of the Army taking over as the nation's ruler. In 1957, he made a complete tour of both East and West Pakistan and interacted with Army officers and soldiers. Second, to provide Ayub with first-hand knowledge about the political situation, Major-General Umrao Khan (G.O.C. East Pakistan) set up interviews with a number of political and local figures during his tour of the province.²⁷

According to reports, General Ayub Khan said, "If the people want me, I won't avoid my responsibilities". The senior commanders understood that they might need to enter politics to save the situation, but they did not want to be accused of overthrowing a civil administration too soon. They thus observed the decline of politics and occasionally voiced their worry. Early in 1958, a few correspondents mentioned political unrest and questioned General Ayub Khan about his plans for defending Pakistan in the event that a hostile neighbour suddenly launched an attack. Do not worry about the country's defence, he retorted.

"That concerns me. Pay attention to your leaders who are destroying the nation. Never bring up external threats. The country itself poses the true threat. Do you not see it?"²⁸

²⁶ Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 200.

²⁷ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, 84.

²⁸ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, 85.

Only a government that is able to completely let go of the past and create fresh plans for the future will be able to put the nation back on the path to financial stability and regain the trust of the populace in the rule of law and the effectiveness of democratic institutions. The general elections could not produce such a government. The only choice the electorate had was to support the politicians who had brought the nation to the brink of disaster. Political parties had not altered their strategies or goals. The Republican Party and the Awami League were using every ruse imaginable, including corruption and extortion, to gain a clear advantage over their rivals.²⁹

Firoz Khan Noon attempted to enlarge his Cabinet at the Centre when there was no necessity for expansion, and the Awami League stated its intention to maintain power through any means necessary despite the 21-Point Program pledge to hand it over six months before the elections. The Army finally decided to overthrow the civil administration after the death of the Deputy Speaker of the East Pakistan Assembly in the final week of September 1958. The C-in-C requested that the Chief of the General Staff create a strategy for seizing control of the civil government. On October 3rd, the plan was completed. The date was originally scheduled to be moved up to the middle of October, but the C-in-C did so because of how quickly political conditions altered. The Muslim League threatened to start a civil disobedience movement in the first week of October. Martial Law was proclaimed and the military takeover was finished in two stages. On the evening of October 7, 1958, the first phase got underway. Political parties were also outlawed by President Iskander Mirza, who also abrogated the Constitution, dissolved the national and provincial assemblies, dismissed the national and provincial cabinets, appointed General Ayub Khan Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and imposed Martial Law throughout Pakistan. President Iskander Mirza outlined the facts that led to his making this decision in his proclamation. He claimed that he had no choice but to take this action due to the hopeless political situation, the rising level of corruption in society, and the politicians' unwillingness to reform their behaviour. On October 8, 1958, General Ayub Khan delivered a speech to the public in which he stated that the Army had entered politics "with great reluctance but with the utmost conviction that there was no other option but the disintegration and total ruin of the country.

²⁹ Ahmad, *Government and Politics*, 115.

"He pleaded with the populace to work with the incoming administration to make things right. The political leaders, smugglers, black marketeers, and disruptors received a final word of caution from him, saying, the military and the people were sick of the sight of you. In order to avoid rapid and sure retribution, it would be in your best interest to turn a new leaf and behave".³⁰

President Ayub himself summarized the transformation that occurred in October 1958 as follows in his political biography:

The time had come. Finally, the long-awaited moment has come. It was no longer possible to put off the obligation. We had all hoped for years that the country's political leaders would realize their serious obligations. Some of the Quaid-i-Azam's close friends and companions who had led the fight for Pakistan with unwavering zeal and commitment were among them. They were patriotic men with talent and ability. Later, they had witnessed Liaquat Ali Khan's calm, brave, and relentless efforts to steer the statecraft through turbulent waters. Each briefly succeeded in grabbing the central trapeze that was ensnared in the arcs of the enormous lights. but in the following instant, I was sucked into a murky web of deceit and competition.³¹

Conclusion:

The partition of India left many things undecided from the side of leadership. The political leadership was premature to control the state of affairs. Obtaining independence was a herculean task which was done by Quaid-i-Azam. After the independence, one thing was still in ambiguity either parliamentary democracy was better than any other form of government or not. In democracy, leadership usually works according to the aspirations of people but in case of Pakistan the first democratic slot stood in the contrast on the wishes of people. Those who were in united India advocating the miseries of Muslims, they could not come true to their promises right after the independence. Countless challenges knocked the door of the nascent state and the leader-

³⁰ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 83.

³¹ Choudhury, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan*, 135.

ship crisis was the worst. The early departure of the Quaid left many things incomplete. Dissentions and reservation were emerged in the Muslim league this not only divided the League but it left indelible effects on the political fabric of the state. Governor general, who was head of the state, left no stone unturned to disrupt the political process in the country. Personal wishes and nepotism were preferred than skilled leadership. The governor general who had all levers of powers in his hands never wanted to dissolve his powers. Constitutional process remained in delay due immature behavior of politicians. Civilian leadership not only provided space to bureaucracy but it also provided a vacuum to military leadership. Resultantly, this space was filled by forces of martial law in the abrogation of constitution in October, 1958. Since the beginning, democracy in Pakistan has been facing critical circumstances as the lack of mature leadership widening this gap day by day and resultantly the state has diverged its direction toward political instability. This is not only impacting Pakistan's economic situation but also damaging the political fabric of the state.